Filiality — the relationship between a parent and child — is undergoing a resurgence in modern China, argued Angela Zito, associate professor of Anthropology and Religious Studies at New York University in her lecture, “China Dreams: Of Filial Values in the Persuasive Form of Social Propaganda,” on Friday.

Zito explained that filiality, which refers to the quality of an interpersonal relationship, typically one between parents and children, is an old virtue in China. In her lecture, she discussed its re-emergence in Chinese culture, as well as its close connection to both state and religion.

“Filiality, a very old and old-fashioned virtue in China,” Zito began, “is undergoing a renaissance of attention. In July of 2013, there was a law [passed for the] rights and benefits of the elderly, and it was amended to include certain clauses aimed to encourage children to especially spend more time with their parents.”

Yet, she continued, “it is unclear just how injunctions to spend the holidays with your parents are going to be enforced and people in China reacted quite strongly online.” She explained that people often ask, ‘“This is a virtue. How did it become a law?’”

“This latest iteration [of the original 24 Filials, a former and ancient set of laws pertaining to filial conduct,] … has skewed toward buffing up intergenerational communications on all fronts. … It marked departure from earlier versions that emphasized the physical bodies of everyone involved.”

Zito described this recent move by the government as “an old-time propaganda roll-out of another revision of the very old — around 1000 [CE] — of the 24 Standards of Filiality,” which are, as she quoted an article from the China Daily, ‘“an unrealistic portraiture of ideal middle-class families in today’s changing society.’”

The topic of filial piety is one that Zito tackles in the book of essays she is currently working on, “Census of Filiality: Bodily Capacities, Forms of Knowing, and Hierarchies of Power, Past and Present.” This work will reflect on the 18th century, “a hey-day of Chinese self-felt cultural hegemony,” while also considering “the current efflorescence in recovering and recuperating the past and past traditions today in China, which is being taken up with nationalist fervor by many sorts of people,” she explained.

Even today, filiality is found to be applicable to the widespread interests of many, “because of its everyday centrality in organizing ethical and spiritual life,” which is why, Zito said, she has “often emphasized filiality in [her] own work” on Chinese culture.

Zito identifies three concurring cultural components that have contributed to the revival of filial piety: “the China Dream, the widespread revival of Confucian and classical teaching and the problem of the care of aging bodies.”

“The China Dream” is a slogan that has become ingrained in culture “like jokes do,” she said. It is a political agenda, voiced by figures such as President Xi Jinping, who incorporated the China Dream in a speech commemorating the reopening of the Chinese National Museum. According to Zito, Jinping’s message “memorialized China’s past humiliations yet in a spirit of overcoming, of transcendence.” Zito noted that this campaign is occurring alongside the approximately 20-year trend of studying the classics and Confucius in particular. “The reinvention of ritual sacrifice, to the sage of Confucius himself — the idea of filiality gets deeply implicated in these activities, a prime object of its ethical goals. Respect for parents and teachers is easily connected to the State’s dream.”

However close the connection between state and Confucian goals is, the state is not enthusiastic to support Confucianism, she added. While “some vocal enthusiasts would like to see Confucianism added to the religious roster … China has only five recognized state religions, and Confucianism is not one of them,” Zito said, explaining that nothing will come of this push for recognition. “Of what use would it be to the state as its own softly-powered cosmic bid if it turned Confucian ritual life to something to be controlled by the Ministry of Religion, instead of channeled by the Ministry of Propaganda?”

Zito argued that the government has a seated interest in promoting filiality in terms of children helping aging parents, “given the crisis in health care, especially for the elderly.” She has observed street art, created by the government, in cities like Shanghai and Beijing, that “avidly pursue[s] the loving illustration of filial bodies and their utilities.” Scenes depict middle-aged children assisting their parents with computers, eating nutritious meals, taking them to the doctor and generally keeping them from neglect or abuse.

Even though the state will refuse to work with the interests of the people in terms of increasing popularity in Confucianism, it will use filiality to acknowledge the needs of its aging demographic, Zito argued. She reported that in 1999, 10 percent of China’s population was over 60 years old, with more than 20 million people over the age of 80.

Filiality, Zito noted, can be applied to a variety of virtues or phases of life, including finances and career motivation.

This newest cultural wave of filiality represents an “abandonment of [the] socialist, idealist,” with a “new emphasis on emotional relations, heart to heart conversations.” The emotional aspect of filiality, in particular the care of elders, is a very urban concept and is only realistically achievable for a certain class of people; some people have pointed out that this notion conflicts with individualization, Zito emphasized.

Regardless, the state, which “reigns supreme [in] communication and propaganda,” will push that the family is “more precious than ever,” because that is in the best interest of the state, she concluded.